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Abstract
A  substantial  literature  indicates  that  the  public  school  system  in  the  United
states  is  inefficient.  Some have  posited  that  this  inefficiency  arises  from  a
Iack  of  competition  in  the  education  market.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Tiebout
hypothesis  suggesls  that  public  schools  already  face  significant  competition.
In  this  paper,  the  authors  examine  the  extent  to  which  competition  for
students  influences  the  distribution  of  public  school  inefficiency  in  Texas.
They  use  a  Shephard  input  distance  function  to  model  educational  production
and  use  bootstrapping  techniques  to  test  for  technical,  allocative  and  scale
inefficiencies.  The  authors  find  evidence  of  substantial  inefficiency  in  the
Texas  school  systen  but  only  weak  and  inconsistent  evidence  that  competition
for  enrollment  enhances  school  district  efficiency  (J.E.L.  I21).
'We r,zould  like  to  thank  Steven  Craig  for  helpful  conutents  and
suggestions.  R.  Hamilton  Lankford,  Robert  Meyer  and  Kimberly  Zieschang
prowided  extensive  comments  on  an  earlier  draf!.  Thomas  Fomby,  Joseph
Hirschberg  and  Esfandiar  l,laasoumi  offered  considerable  econometric  advice.  0f
course,  all  remaini.ng  errors  are  our  own,  We note  that  the  views  expressed  in
this  paper  do  not  necessarily  reflect  those  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of
Dallas  or  the  Federal  Reserve  Svstem-f  Introduction
A  substantial  literature  indicates  that  the  public  school  system  in  the
United  States  is  inefficient.  Hanushek's  1986  survey  of  the  literature  on
educational  production  functions  owerwhelmingly  concludes  that  expenditures
are  uncorrelated  with  student  achievement  gains.  Cost  function  studies  and
data  envelopment  analyses  support  similar  conclusions  (see,  for  exarnple,
Bessent  et  al .  L982,  FAre,  et  aL  L989 or  Callan  and  Santerre  1990).
Some have  posited  that  this  inefficiency  arises  from  a  lack  of  competition
in  the  education  market.  Chubb  and  Moe  (1990  and  1991)  find  evidence  that
administrative  autonomy  fosters  school  efficlency  and  argue  that  increased
competition  anong  schools  rrould  promote  such  autonomy.  Other  researchets
attribute  school  inefficiency  to  the  monopoly  powers  of  the  public  school
system  (for  examples,  see  Boaz  L99L ox  cwartney  1991).
on  the  other  hand,  public  schools  in  the  U.S.  may  already  face  significant
competition  in  the  sense  of  Tiebout  (1955).  As  the  Tiebout  model  would
prediet,  a  number  of  researchers  have  demonstrated  that  a  greater  variety  of
public  schools  in  a metropolitan  area  leads,  ceteris  paribus,  to  increased
homogeneity  within  local  jurisdictions,  (Harnilton  et  aL.  L9'15, Eberts  and
Gronberg  1981,  Grarolich  and  Rubinfeld  1982,  Munley  1982  and  Grubb  1-982).  Jud
(1983)  denonstrates  that  residents  express  their  preferences  for  public
schools  by  voting  with  their  feet.  Martinez-Vazqlez  and  Seauan  (1985)  ftnd
that  priwate  schools  are  less  prevalent  in  communities  with  a  wariety  of
public  school  choices.  Hoxby  (1994)  and  Borland  and Housen  (1993)  find
evidence  that  Herfindahl  indices  of  cor0petition  for  student  enrollment  can
explain  some of  the  variation  in  educational  production.
To  ewaluate  directly  the  connection  between  school  efficiency  and
competition  for  students,  we  nodel  the  Inultiple  output,  multiple  input  schoolptoduction  technology  using  a  Shephard  (1953)  input  distance  function.  By
bootstrapping  the  distance  funetion,  Irte can  test  for  technical,  allocative  and
scale  inefficiencies  in  educational  production.  lie  find  only  weak  evidence
that  competition  for  students  influences  the  distribution  of  public  school
inefficiency  in  Texas.  Thus,  our  analysis  implies  that  reforms  aimed  solely
at  increasing  competition  among  schools  may  not  achieve  the  desired  results.
rl-  rne  Llteracure
over  the  yeats,  economists  have  used  a  variety  of  teehniques  to  evaluate
school  performance.  Most  researchers  hawe  focused  on  estimating  single-
output,  average  production  functions  for  schooling.  Although  a  few  recen!
studies  hawe  exarnined  monetary  returns  to  schooling  (Betts  1995  and  Card  and
Krueger  L992a,  l992bl,  the  most  co  mon measures  of  educational  outputs  have
been  test  scores  (for  examples,  see  Berger  and  Toma 1994,  Eberts  and  Stone
1987,  Wahlberg  and  Fowler  1987  and  the  literature  surveyed  in  Hanushek  1985).
Generally,  researchers  assume  that  schools  produce  these  educational  outputs
using  inputs  related  to  school  personnel,  per-pupil  expenditures,  and  family
background.  '
The  production  functions  yield  estimates  of  the  rnarginal  Products  of  the
inputs,  and  allow  researchers  to  infer  which  inputs  vrould  have  the  greatest
marginal  impact  on  achievenent.2  lilost  researchers  using  this  approach  have
found  that  inputs  within  school  district  control  (such  as  expenditures  or
class  sizes)  have  litcle  or  no  marginal  irnpact  on  test  scores  (Hanushek  1986)
lSee  Cohn  and  Geske  (1990)  for  a  thorough  revlew  of  the  outPut  and
input  measures  employed  in  these  types  of  studies,
2see  Levin  (1-974)  and  Hanushek  (L979)  fox  critical  reviews  of  the
production  function  approach.3
Card  and Krueger  (L992a,  L992b)  find  evidence  that  school  inputs  have  a
positive  effect  on the  monetary  returns  to  schooling,  but  their  analysis  is
based  on  state-Ievel  data  about  school  characteristics  and may be  subject  to
aggregation-induced  biases  (see  Hanushek, Rivkln  and Taylor  1995).  Using  less
aggregate data,  Betts  (1995) finds  no evidence of  rnatginal  effects.
Recently,  some researchers  have  roodified  production  function  analysis  to
incorporate  scale,  technical  and allocative  lnefficiencies,  and nultiple
measures of  educational  output.  Most  of  che researchers  using  this
generalized  approach  have  relied  on nonstochastic  techniques  like  data
envelopment analysis  (e.g.,  Bessent and Bessent 1980; Bessent et  al.  t982,
l-984; Fare et  al.  1-989;  and Grosskopf et  aI.  1994).  Howewer,  a few
researchers  have  used  stochastic  cechniques.  DeIIer  and Rudnicki  (1993)
asslrne that  school  inefficiency  has  a half-normal  distribution  and use maxirnum
Iikelihood  techniques  to  estimate  a  single-output  frontier  production
function.  McCarty  and Yaisawarng  (1993)  and Ray  (l-991)  cornb  ine  DEA  and
regression  analysis  in  a partially  stochastic  trro-step  procedure  that
incorporates  rnultiple  outputs.3  Grosskopf  et  al.  (forthcorning)  use  an
indirect  output  distance  function  to  examine the  consequences of  budgetary
reforms  when school  districts  are  inefficient.  Like  the  production-function
analyses,  these  studies  generally  find  evidence  of  substantial  school
ihaffi^iah^r,
Analyses  of  educational  cost  functions  yield  sinilar  results.  Barrow
(1991)  estiurated  a  cost  function  frontier  for  schools  in  England  and  found
3In  the  first  step,  they  construct  efficiency  measures  fot  schools
by  applying  DEA to  data  on multiple  educational  outcomes and
discretionary  inputs  (such  as  teachers  and  adninistrators).  In  the
second  step,  they  regress  the  efficiency  measures on a  set  of  non-
discretionary  inputs  (such  as  student  body  characteristics).that  actual  costs  were  4  percent  to  l-6  Dercent  above  the  minimum  estimated
cost  for  the  schools  in  his  sanple.  Callan  and  Santetre  (1990)  found  evidence
that  school  districts  in  Connecticut  produce  primary  and  secondary  education
using  inefficiently  large  quantlties  of  capital  and  transportation  services.
Jimenez  (1985)  concluded  that  schools  in  Boliwia  and  Paraguay  used  excessive
amounts  of  capital  and  that  many  of  the  schools  in  Bolivia  exhibited
diseconomies  of  scale.  Eberts  and  Stone  (1986)  found  that  rent  extraction  in
the  form  of  higher  teacher  salaries  adds  between  7  percent  and  15  percent  to
educational  costs  in  unionized  school  districts  in  the  United  states.
IIf  The  Distance  FunctlpE
l,'Ie  use  a  Shephard  (1953)  input  distance  function  to  model  school
production  and  generate  measures  of  technical,  allocative  and  scale
inefficiency.  The  input  distance  function  is  a  convenien!  tool  for  analyzing
potentially  lnefficient  public  enterprises  for  a  number  of  reasons.  Because
the  distance  function  is  dual  to  the  cost  function,  it  lends  itself  to  fully
stochastic  frontier  estimation  without  sacrificing  the  ability  to  evaluate
multiple  oulputs.  However,  unlike  the  cost  function,  the  input  distance
function  requlres  data  on  input  quantities  rather  than  input  prices.  Thus,
the  distance  function  is  preferable  in  cross-section  settings  where  prices  do
not  vary,  such  as  when  making  comparisons  across  schools  r,rithin  a  single  labor
narket.  The  distance  function  also  has  the  advantage  for  orrr  purposes  of
being  'ragnostic"  with  respect  to  the  economic  motivation  of  ttre  decision
rnaker,  unlike  the  cost  function  which  presumes  cost  rninimizing  behavior.n
alfhile  the  cost
inefficiency  can  be
outlined  by  S  chrnidt
function  assunes  cost  rniniroizing
allor,red  for  in  the  cost  functi-on
and Sickles  (1984).
using  techniquesForrnally,  the  input  distance  function  is  a mapping  from  the  set  of  all
nonnegative  input  vectors  x  :  (x1,  xz,  . ..,  xN) and nonnegative  output  vectors
y:  (Y,  , yz,  ...,  yH) into  the real  line,  i.e.,
D(y,x)= uax (.\:  ("/(r))  is an elenent in L(y)]
(1)
wnere
L(y)  = t(x):  x can  produce  y). 
(2)
The dlstance  function  satisfies  fairly  general  regularity  ProPerties  (see  Fare
and Grosskopf  (1990) for  details),  including  being  homogeneous  of  degree one
in  inputs,  concave  in  lnprrts,  convex  in  outputs,  and nondecreasing  in  inPuts.
The distance  function  is  perhaps  most  easily  understood  with  the  aid  of  a
diagram.  Consider  Figure  L.  Observation  K  ernploys the  inPut  bundle  (xt,x1)
to  produce  output  level  y.  The discance  function  seeks  the  largest
proportional  contraction  of  that  input  bundle  which  allows  Production  of  the
orlginal  output  level  y  (whieh  may be  a vector).  In  this  example,  the  value
of  the  distance  functlon  fot  obsetvation  K  is  OK/OK''  Thi-s illustrates  the
following  characteristic  of  the  distance  function,  namely
(3)
D(y,x)  >  1  <->  x€L(y).
Furthernore,  D(y,x)  :  1  if  and only  if  the  input  bundle  is  an element  of  the
isoquant  of  L(y).  The reciprocal  of  the  value  of  the  input  distance  function
is  the  Farrell  (1957)  input-saving  measure of  technical  efficiency.  I'Ie use  it
to  measure wariations  in  technical  efficiency  among school  districts.
As  discussed  in  Blackorby  and Russell  (1989)  the  first  derivatives  of  the
input  distance  function  lrith  respect  to  input  quantities  yield  (cost-deflated)6
to shadort or  support  prices  of  those  inputs.s  We can use  these  shadow prices
test  for  allocative  efficiency.  Let ru:  (w.,wr,...,wN), \dhere  r,/  is  positive,
be  the  vector  of  observed  input  prices.  If  a municlpality  is  allocatively
efficient  then  the  followine  hol"ds:
D' (y,")  /Dt(y,x)  =wi/wj,  fot  all  i,  j  = 1,2,."t1. (4)
Di  is  the  first  derivative  of  D(y,x)  and  is  interpreted  as  the  virtual  or
shadow  price  of  the  ith  input.  Alternatively,  we  can  define  a  measure  ,cir as
the  degree  to  which  the  shador,r price  ratio  agrees  with  the  actual  price  ratio,
where  the  fornulation  in  (5)  follows  the  nonrnlnimal  cost  literature,g
_  Dr(. ) /Dj (. ) ---nJ\
see for  example Toda (1976) or  Atkinson  and Halvorsen  (1986).
If  rcil -  l  for  all  i,i  then  the  observation  is  said  to  be  aLlocatively
efficient.  When rc'  I  1 we can have  the  following  non-optimal  situations.
6rr





17\ rcr,  (  l,
factor  i  is  overutilized  rel-ative  to  j  at  observed
2,  the  school  dlstrict  is  observed  to  enploy  input
relative  prices.  In  figure
bundle  i.  The observed
sThis  result  follor,rs  frorn  Shephard's  (dual)  lemma because  the  input
distance  funccion  is  dual  to  the  cost  function  (see  Fare  and GrosskoPf
(1ee0)  )  .
51n this  literature,  firms  are  assurned  to  minlmize  (unobservable)  shadow
costs  given  (unobservable)  shadow prices.  This  is  achieved  by  introducing
additional  parameters  into  the  cost  function  that  essentially  allow  input
prices  to  "pivot".  These parameters  are  used  to  construct  the  rcil  in  equation
5.  Unlike  the  distance  function  metbodology,  this  technique  cannot  identify
firrn-specific  relative  shadow  orlces.relative  price  of  the  tno  inputs  is  given  by  the  absolute  value  of  the  slope
of  the  line  w.  Ihe  relatiwe  shadow  prices  (ratio  of  marginal  products)  that
supports  the  input  vector  i  is  given  by  the  absolute  value  of  the  slope  w*w'*.
In  this  case  the  ratio  of  shadow  prices  is  less  than  the  ratio  of  observed
prices  irnplying  that  input  i  is  overutilized  relative  to  input  j.  That  is,  kil
<  1.  Based  on  observed  relative  prices,  allocative  efficiency  occurs  at  x/,
where  the  isoquant  is  tangent  to  the  line  w'w'  which  is  parallel  to  the  line
w.  Another  way  of  interpreting  the  value  of  kr;  (  I  is  that  the  marginaL
product  pef  dollar  paid  the  input  j  exceeds  the  marginal  product  per  dol1ar
paid  for  input  i  at  the  observed  input  mix  and  prices.
trrtrile  the  partial  derivatives  of  the  distance  function  nith  respect  to
inputs  can  be  used  to  indicate  allocative  inefficiency,  the  partial
derivatives  of  the  distance  function  with  respec!  to  outpufs  can  be  used  to
indicate  economies  of  scale  (see  Filre  and  Grosskopf  L994).  7f  the  input
distance  function  scale  elasticity
. _  _  rz(***, (8)
is  greater  than  1,  then  the  observation  is  exhibitlng  increasing  returns  to
scale.  lf  e  is  less  than  L,  then  the  observation  is  exhiblting  decreasing
returns  to  scale,  Constant  returns  to  scale  inply  that  €  -  1.
rv -  lne  uata
The  Texas  Research  League  provides  data  for  the  1988-89  school  year  on
Texas'  1055  public  school  districts.  The  data  include  infornation  on
enrollment,  the  effective  number  of  teachers,  administrators,  staff  andI
teacher  aides  employed  in  each  district  (per  pupil).,  the  average  salaries  paid
to  each  type  of  employee  and  other  school  characteristics  .  The  Texas
Education  Agency  (TEA)  provides  infornation  by  school  district  on  average
student  achievement  in  reading,  writing  and  mathematics  in  odd  numbered
grades,  the  number  of  students  taking  the  test  battery  by  grade  level,  student
ethnicity  and  other  student  body  characteristics.  Together,  the  combined
sources  provide  complete  information  on  303  public  school  districts  with  at
least  100  students  in  both  the  5th  and  l1th  grades.?  From  these  data,  we
construct  measutes  of  school  outputs,  student  and  fanily  inputs  and  school
inprrts  for  each  school  district.  We use  data  on  total  enrollments  in  aII
public  and  accredited  private  schools  in  Texas  to  construct  measures  of  the
degree  of  competition  among school  distrlcts,
Output  lIeasures
The  literature  on  measuri.ng  school  effects  has  reached  a  broad  consensus
that  the  most  appropriate  measure  of  school  output  is  the  marginal  effect  of
the  school  on  educational.  outcones  (see,  for  example,  Hanushek  1986,  Hanushek
and  Taylor  1990,  Aitkin  and  Longford  L986  ox  Boardman  and  Murnane  1-979).  we
use  student  achievement  on  a  battery  of  test  scores  as  lhe  relevant
educational  outcome  and  extract  the  marginal  effect  of  schools  by  following
the  value-added  residuals  techniques  described  in  Hanushek  and  Taylor  and
Ai.tkin  and  Lonsford.
7We  reslrict  our  attention  to  school  districts  with  at  least  100  students
in  each  of  the  relevant  grades  to  avoid  sampling  problems  that  might  be
introduced  by  a  srnall  mrmber  of  students,  Furthermore,  we  exclude  the  Dallas
independent  school  district  from  the  analysis  because  it  had  rnore  than  twice
the  enrolluent  of  the  next-largest  school  district  for  which  we  had  data.
Data  were  not  available  for  many  of  the  large  school  districts  in  the  state,Thus,  we estimate  school  district  output  per  pupil  using  Texas  Educational
Assessment of  Minirnurn  Skills  (TEAMS)  scores  in  mathematics,  readlng  and
writing,  data  on  changes  in  cohort  size,  and demographic  data  on the  racial
and  socioeconomic  composition  of  the  s  tudent  body  (Texas  Education  Agency
f987,  L989).  At  Lhe primary  (5th  grade)  and secondary (1lth  grade)  levels,  we
estimate  the  per-pupi1  value  added by  the  school  district  accordlng  to
equation (9).
2
ln(TEAMS89"n)  - on  * 
E6,n 
1n(ETHNrCrTY"j)  + 6,s1n(SES")
(e)
7
+ 6  4"1n  (XCOHORT"q)  * t  6j"ln(TEAMS87"i,n_,,)  * .",
where  the  ln(.)  operator  denotes  the  natural  log  of  the  variable,  TEAMS89"'  is
the  average  total  TEAMS  scores  for  school  district  s  for  grade  level  g  in
1989, TEAMS87"1  1",t i"  the  average TEAMS  score  in  subject  j  (reading,  lrriting
and mathematics)  for  the  same cohort  t\ro  years  previously,  ETHNICITY"I  is  the
fraction  of  the  student  body  of  school  district  s  that  is  non-hispanic  WHITE
or  HTSPANIC  (respectively),  SES"  is  the  fraction  of  the  student  body of  school
district  s  that  is  not  receiving  free  or  reduced-price  lunches  (the  best
available  proxy  for  socio-eeonomic  status),  XCOHORT"g  is  the  ratio  of  the
grade  g cohort  size  in  1989 divided  by  the  grade  g-2  cohort  size  in  L981 (a
control  to  prevent  schools  from  improving  their  average  score  by  shedding
students),  and  the  estimated  residual,  €sg, represents  the  awerage value  added10
per  pupil  in  school  district  s,  plus  an  error  tern.3
Estinating  school  outputs  as  equation  residuals  generates  output  measures
that  represent  deviations  from  the  state  average.  School  districts  that  add
Iess  value  than  the  state  average  hawe  negative  output  measures.  Since  the
distance  function  methodology  cannot  handle  negative  outputs,  we  transform  the
value-added  residuals  into  tractable  per-pupil  output  neasures  by  addint  the
mean  of  the  log-transformed  post-test  scores  to  the  corresponding  value-added
residuals,  To  further  transform  the  per-pupil  output  measures  into  total
output  measures,  we  add  the  1og  of  grade-level  enrollment  (ENROLL"g).
Therefore,
Ln (owPwEs\  = ETTffi8-gJ  + e"s+  ln(ENRoLLus) (10)
is  our  proxy  for  the  output  of  school  district  s.  It  represents  the  total
achievement  lewel  r^re  would  expect  school  district  s  to  produee  if  it  had  the
same student-body  cornposltion  as  the  sample  average.  Alternatively,  one  can
think  of  OUTPUT.g  as  the  level  of  total  student  achievement  purged  of  the
effect  of  home production  and  earlier  achiewement.  t  Si"nce we  are  examining
value  added  on  achiewement  test  scores  in  grades  5,  and  11,  there  are  two
outDuts  for  each  school  distriet,
sBecause  the  t\uo  walue-added  equations  share  cornmon regressors  (ETHNICITYT,j
and  SESi)  we  suspected  a  cross-equations  correlation  between  the  error  terus,
and  therefore  among our  oucput  measures.  We found  that  the  correlations
between  error  terms  were  surprisingly  lolr  (in  the  neighborhood  of  0.22),  but
significant  and  therefore  estimate  the  output  measures  simultaneously  using
the  standard  SAS package  for  seemingly  unrelated  regression  (SUR).
eWe  note  that  this  general  technique  r,ras also  employed  by  Callan  and
Santerre  (1990)  to  arrive  at  a  measure  of  educational  quality.  However,
Callan  and  Santerre  did  not  hawe  access  to  pretest  information  and  therefore
were  unable  to  derive  a  value-added  qualitv  measure,ll
Tn^ttf  Maa  <t1ra  e
We focus  on  two  variable  lnputs  within  school  district  control  --
instructional  and  administrative  personnel.  lJe  define  the  quantity  of
instructional  inputs  per  pupil  as  the  weighted  average  of  the  number  of
teachers  and  teacher  aides  per  pupil.l0  The  quantity  of  administrative  inputs
per  pupil  is  the  weighted  average  of  che  number  of  administrators  and  support
personnel  per  pupil.1l  In  both  cases,  \re  derive  weights  from  the  average
wages  paid  for  the  personnel  categories.  To  generate  measures  of  total
instructional  (INST)  and  adrninistratiwe  (NTNST)  inputs,  we  multiply  these  per-
pupil  measures  of  variable  input  by  the  sum of  the  enrollments  in  grades  5  and
1L  (ENROLL" :  ENRoLL"5  +  ENROLL.II),
Other  important  school  inputs  are  beyond  school  district  control,  at  least
in  the  near  term.  I,Ie have  identified  two:  the  quantities  of  non-labor  school
inputs  and  family  inputs,  Unfortunately,  there  are  no  direct  measures  for
either  of  these  inputs.  Because  expenditures  on  mairlterlance  and  operations
should  be  a  positiwe  function  of  the  size  of  the  capital  stock,  we  use  data  on
school  district  expenditures  on  maintenance  and  operatlons  per  pupil,
nultiplied  by  ENROLL", as  our  proxy  for  the  quantity  of  non-Iabor  inputs
(M&OINPUT).r2  I,Ie use  the  exponent  of  the  predicted  values  frorn  equation  (9)
multiplied  by  the  corresponding  grade-level  enrollments  (  ENROLL"s) to  measure
10ldea11y,  rue would  like  to  adjust  the  quantity  mrmbers  for  variations  in
teacher  quality.  Horrever,  Hanushek  (1986)  has  demonstrated  that  observable
teacher  characteristics  like  salary,  experience  and  educational  background  do
not  indicate  classroom  effectLveness,  Lacking  a  reliable  indicator  of  teacher
quality,  we  treat  teachers  as  homogeneous.
llSupport  personnel  lnclude  supervisors,  counselors,  librarians,  nurses,
physicians  and  special  service  personnel.
"Callan  and  Santerre  (1990)  use  a  sinilar  proxy  for  capital  stock.12
the  contribution  of  home  production  at  each grade level  (STUINPUT.').!3 In
essence,  STUINPUT"s is  an  index  that  depends  on  the  ethnic  and  socio-econornic
composj-tion  of  the  school  district,  the  percentage  change  in  enrollment  for
each  grade,  and  past  achievement  test  scores.  For  each  school  district  there
are  two  measures  of  fixed  student  inputs  corresponding  to  the  primary  and
secondary  grade  lewels,
Competit  ion  lTeasutes
Finally,  we  construct  six  neasures  of  the  degree  of  competition  for
students.  First,  following  Hoxby  (1994)  and  Borland  and  Housen  (1993),  we
construct  Herfindahl  indices  of  student  enrollnent  for  each  metropolitan
statistical  area  (MSA),14  Second,  we construct  concentration  ratios  for  each
MSA.15  lhird,  we determined  each  school  district's  share  of  the  enrollment
market  in  its  MSA.  FinaIIy,  we  recalculate  all  three  measures  (Herfindahl
indices,  concentration  ratios  and  market  shares)  using  counties  rather  lhan
metropolitan  areas  to  define  the  televant  markets.  The  58  rural  school
districts  in  our  sample  can  be  included  in  the  competltion  measures  whenever
lhe  relevant  market  is  defined  as  a  county.  For  all  of  the  competition
measures,  we  use  data  on  total  enrollments  in  both  public  and  accreditec
private  schools  (Texas  Education  Agency  1990,  1989).  Table  1 presents
l3LIe take  the  exponent  of  the  predlcted  values  frorn  (9)  in  order  to  undo
the  logarithnic  transformation.
laThe  Herfindahl  index  for  a  giwen  market  is  the  sum of  the  squared
enrollment  shares  for  all  of  the  publlc  and  private  school  districts  in  that
market,
15The concentration  ratio  for  a  given  market  is  the  sum of  enrollment
shares  for  the  four  largest  school  districts  (public  or  private)  in  that
market,13
descriptive  statistics  for  our measures of enrollment  competition.
V.  Estimation
Ihe  translog  cost  function  has  a  long  history  of  use  in  estimating  cost
functions  because  of  its  flexibility  and ability  to  nest  various  hypotheses
within  its  structure.  In  this  analysis  we use  a  translog  forr0  for  the
distance  function.  Suppressing  the  observational  subscript,
lnD=c*EP'  In*.,.tXt
jjk
.  Ea  ls1 * L  L 
'l:-  rnx,  rnzr  +
jr
+!r_Lny_-rtt
rnxj  rrD(< * LL  p.,^ rnxj  rnyr
im
6  .Irrz,  + \  EE  t .,  lnz.  Lnz  ,
rl
lny.  lny"+  e.
F
(  11a)
where  xj  is  uhe quantity  for  discretionary  inputs  (INST and NINST),  z.  is  the
quantity  for  non-discretionary  inputs  (STUINPUT5,  STUINPUTTI and M&OINPUT)
and y.  are  the  output  quantities  (OUTPUT5  and OUTPUT,,).  We impose homogeneity
in  the discretionary  inputs  (DB":1,  tB." :  O, Ep* -  O, Xf*:0)  as required
by  the  definition  of  the  input  distance  functior,.
one advantage  of  the  translog  specification  is  that  by  Shepherd's  lemma
the  first  derivative  of  (1la)  with  respect  to  xl  equals  the  expenditure  share
for  input  1  (S, -  w,x,/(wrx,  +  wrxr)).  Because estimating  the  distance  function
and the  share  equation  together  in  a  system  of  sirnultaneous  equations  would
improve  the  efficiency  of  the  estimated  parameters,  vre use  the  observed  input
quantities  and the  ratio  of  the  state-level  average  prices  for  teachers  and
adrninistrators  (P:w,/w.)  !o  define  instructional  expenditure  shares  (S,)  for
each observation.  We use  the  ratlo  of  average  pfices  to  derive  expenditure
shares  rather  than  the  observed  relative  prices  because  the  observed  pricesI4
may include  rents.16
Thus,  we  estimate  the  following  system  of  equations
lnD=o*X  B,  ln"  - YEE  F;*  lrx, lnx*  r !f
jjkj.
* XX  r;, lnx,  lnz, * !  o.rnz.  * L  IE  6n
j!.,j
* p  .r.  rny. - t 
Fp 
l*  lny. lny,+  6,
S, = F, * p,,lnx,  * B,,Lnx. * !r,.l.ty,  * Er,.lttr,
Pi.  lnx,  1nY.
+p
( 1r-b  )
using  restricted  least  squares  to  acconmodate  the  nonvariance  of  the  left  hand
side  of  the  first  equation.
By  definition,  the  input  distance  function  is  bounded  frorn  below  by  L.
However,  the  predicted  values  of  the  first  equation  in  (lLb)  (the  log  of  the
distance  function)  are  distributed  around  zero,  Therefore,  r^'e follor,r  Gteene
(1980)  in  adjusting  the  inlercept  term  by  adding  the  absolute  value  of  largest
OLS residual  (nax(r)).  The  scallng  yields  walues  of  the  first  equation  in
(11b)  that  are  greater  than  0,  which  when  transforrned  yield  walues  for  the
estimated  distance  function  that  are  greater  than  l-.  As  mentioned  abowe,
inverting  the  value  of  the  input  distance  function  for  each  observation  yields
our  measure  of  FarreII  technical  inefficlency  (r.).  Values  of  z,  range  from  0
to  1,  with  a  value  of  1  indicating  that  the  school  district  is  technically
efficient  (in  the  sense  that  output  could  not  be  increased  without
reallocating  vatiable  inputs).
Because  expenditure  shares  by  definition  sum to  one,  the  predicted  values
frorn  the  instructional  share  equation  (together  with  the  variable  input
quantities  and  the  ratio  of  average  prices  P:w./w')  provide  sufficient
r6hnp1lcitly,  this  approach  assumes  that  although  wage  levels  may vary
among  comunities  in  the  sample,  teachers  and  administrators  receive  the  sane
compensating  differential  or  cost-of-l-iw1ng  differential  (in  percentage
terms ) .l5
t7 information  to  generate  a  polnt  estimate  of  rc for  each  school  district  (ti")
If  rc" )  L  (<1)  then  the  wage-deflated  marginal  product  of  instructors  is
greater  than  (less  than)  the  wage-deflated  marginal  product  of  administrative
staff,  We use  the  walue  of  ,i6 as  our  measure  of  allocatlve  inefficiency:  uhe
farther  rc. is  from  1,  the  greater  is  lhe  difference  between  the  markec  price
and  the  obserwed  price  and  the  more  allocatively  inefficient  j-s  the  school
district  -
We use  coefficient  estimates  from  the  first  equation  in  (1lb)  to  generate
estimates  of  scale  elasticity  (e")  as  defined  by  equation  (8).  Because
equation  (8)  indicates  scale  elasticity  with  respect  to  variable  inputs  and
our  analysis  incorporates  fixed  inputs  (M&oINPUT and  STUINPUTg),  €"  should  be
interpreted  as  a  short-run  measure  of  scale  inefficiency,
We would  also  like  to  be  able  to  indicate  ruhether  or  not  our  measures  of
technical  (2"),  allocative  (rc.) and  scale  (e.)  inefficiency  are  statistically
meaningful.  To  conduct  the  significance  tests  l^re  perforD  a  nested  bootstrap.
Specifically,  we  create  250  data  sets  of  303  observations  each  based  on  random
draws  with  replacement  from  the  original  sample.  Equation  (9)  is  then  re-
estimated  for  each  of  these  data  sets.  The  resulting  OUTPUT"s  and  STUINPUT"'
measures  are  used  to  re-estimate  (11b).  Finally,  we use  the  250  estimates  of
the  coefficients  from  (9)  and  (11b)  in  conjunction  with  the  original  data  set
l7With  some rearrangement,  the  definition  of  rc12  given  in  equation  5
b  e  corae  s
n  = ( 3D/3*, 
t yw,  =13D/3x,,,.p '?5784" 
\ 
'di7a\'  '
where  xr  in  INSTR and x,  is  NINST.  Because there  are  only  two vatiable  inputs
under  consideration,  we have  dropped  the  subscripts  on rc indicacing  input
cvDe  .lo
to  create  250 measures of  r.,  n.  and  e" for  each  observation.  Tables  3 and 4
compare the  coefficient  estimates  from  the  bootstrapping  procedure  to  those
generated  by  the  original  estimation.
I{e  use  the  distribution  of  the  bootstrapped  efficiency  measures  to
indicate  statistical  signifieance.  For  technical  inefficiency,  we  consider
the  observation  to  be  statistically  inefficlent  when ts  is  less  than  1  at
least  95 percent  of  the  time.  For  allocative  inefficlency,  we  consider  the
observation  to  be  statistically  inefficient  when  rc" is  either  greater  than  1
at  least  95  percent  of  the  time,  or  less  than  l-  at  least  95  percent  of  the
uime.  The  observation  is  exhibiting  increasing  returns  to  scale  when  €s is
greater  than  I  at  least  95  percent  of  the  tiroe,  and  exhibiting  decreasing
returns  to  scale  when  e"  is  less  than  1at  least  95 percent  of  the  time,
VI Results
Table  5 presents  descriptive  statistics  on  our  three
district  inefficiency.  From  the  underlying  information,




first,  nost  of  the  school  districts  in  our  sample  are  inefficient.  Of  the
303  school  districts  in  our  sample,  onLy  2  can  be  considered  efficient  in  a1l
three  dimensions.  In  contrast.  39  are  inefficient  in  all  three  dimensions.
Technical  inefficiency  is  rnore  co mon  than  scale  of  allocative  inefficiency.
Second,  the  inefficiencies  are  substantial.  On awerage,  the  school
districts  in  our  sampLe  could  reduce  costs  by  at  least  27  percent  by  beconing
technically  efficient.  Because  it  is  possible  that  even  the  best  practice
technology  observed  in  our  data  incorporates  some  inefficiency,  this  estimate
can  be  thought  of  as  a  lower  bound  on  district  inefficiency.t'l
Third,  there  is  a  distinct  pattern  to  the  allocative  inefficiency  in  the
sample.  For  every  observation  where  r,re could  detect  allocative  inefficiency,
rc >  L  indicatlng  that  the  marginal  productivity  of  teachers  per  dollar  paid
is  significantly  greater  than  the  marginal  productivity  of  administrators  per
dollar  paid.  The  analysis  strongly  suggests  that  Texas  school  districts  tend
!o  misallocate  their  resources  in  favor  of  administrative  personnel,  ceteris
paribus.
Fourth,  most  Texas  school  districts  exhibit  constant  Teturns  to  scale.
The  remainder  exhibit  decreasins  returns  to  scale.  There  is  no  evidence  that
school  districts  of  at  least  moderate  size  can  exploit  increasing  returns,
Finally,  as  the  data  in  Tables  6  and  7  indicate,  we  find  only  weak  and
inconsistent  evidence  that  increases  in  the  degree  of  competition  for  students
enhance  school  district  efficiency.  When we  use  metropolitan  areas  to  define
the  relevant  aarkets,  we  find  no  significant  correlation  betrteen  our  measures
of  inefficiency  and  any  measure  of  competltion,  When we  use  counties  to
define  the  relevant  markets,  we  find  a  weak  co*elation  between  the  degree  of
technical  inefficiency  and  the  extent  of  market  comPetition.  School  districts
tend  to  be  less  efficient  in  counties  with  concentrated  markets  (as  measured
by  Herfindahl  indices  or  concentration  ratios),  but  the  effect  is  modest  and
not  ewident  in  all  of  the  relewant  correlation  coefficients.  The  ewidence
also  suggests  that  school  districts  with  larger  shares  of  county  enrollment
tend  to  be  less  technically  efficient  than  school  districts  with  smaller
market  shares.  Since  there  is  no  sienificant  correlation  between  a  school
district's  size  and  its  measured  a".jrrr"r,  efficiency,  this  effect  may also
indicate  the  influence  of  coDpetitive  pressures.
One possible  explanation  for  this  muted response  to  competitive  pressuresl8
is  excessive  regulation.  In  1989,  the  Texas  legislature  regulated  class  sizes,
administrative  and  support  staffing  and  teacher  salaries.  Researeh  by
Grosskopf  et  al.  (L994)  suggests  that  such  regulations  constrain  the  personnel
allocations  of  most  Texas  school  districts,  In  this  case,  regulatory
constraints  leawe  school  districts  unable  to  respond  to  market  incentives  and
measures  of  efficiency  would  have  no  relation  with  measures  of  cor0petition.
Alternacively,  one  could  interpret  our  results  as  ewidence  that  the  Texas
education  market  is  contestable.  Ttre  contestable  markets  literature  holds
that  it  is  potential  competltion  from  potential  entrants  rather  than
competition  from  actiwe  suppliers  that  induces  efficient  firn  behavlor  (I,Iilllg
1-987).  If  Texas'  education  markets  are  sufficiently  contestable  then  our
ueasures  of  competition  need  not  reflect  the  actual  competitive  pressures
facing  Texas  school  distrlcts,  and  one  need  not  expect  a  strong  correlation
between  our  measures  of  conpetition  and  school  district  efficiency.l'  To  the
extent  that  the  markets  for  primary  and  secondary  education  are  already
contestable,  there  may be  little  reason  to  believe  thaC  policies  (like
vouchers)  designed  to  foster  additional  active  coupetition  would  also  foster
additional  school  district  efficiency.
Finally,  one  could  interpret  our  results  as  evidence  against  the  Tiebout
hypothesis.  The  hypothesis'  prediction  that  conpetition  among jurisdictions
creates  market-like  incentives  for  efficient  governnent  leads  us  to  expect  a
correlation  bet\teen  the  degree  of  competition  and  governrnental  efficiency.
Because  vre find  such  a  correlatlon  only  occasionally  and  weakly,  our  evidence
offers  little  support  for  this  hypothesis.
lswithout  a  measure  of  potential  competition  (or  what  l.lorrison  and
Winston  (1987)  call  a  "hit-and-run"  variable)  we  cannot  test  this  hypothesis.l9
VIL  Conclusions
Using  an  input  distance  function  to  model  the  relationship  among  the
rnultiple  inputs  and  multiple  outputs  of  Texas  school  districts,  we  find
evidence  of  widespread  inefflciency.  Most  school  districts  in  our  sample  are
technlcally  inefficient  and  more  than  two-thirds  of  the  districts  misallocate
resources  to  favor  adDinistrative  staff  at  the  exDense  of  classroom
instructors,
Policies  that  foster  competition  a$ong  school  districts  hawe  been  proposed
as  a  partial  solution  to  the  probleur  of  school  inefficiency.  However,  school
districts  already  face  competition  for  enrollments  from  private  schools  and
other  area  public  schools.  If  inefficiency  in  the  school  system  could  be
reduced  by  increasing  the  degree  of  competition  among  schools,  then  we  would
expect  to  find  evidence  that  school  districts  that  currently  face  a  lot  of
competition  are  more  efficient  than  school  districts  that  currently  face  less
competition.
We can  find  only  weak  and  inconsistent  evidence  in  favor  of  such  a
ptoposal.  Tf  one  uses  metropolitan  areas  to  define  the  relevant  markets
there  is  no  systematic  variation  in  Herfindahl  indices,  concentration  raEios
or  market  shares  that  would  suggest  that  competition  for  enrollment  enhances
school  dislrict  efficiency.  If  one  uses  counties  to  define  markets,  there  is
weak  evidence  that  competition  erirances  school  district  efficiency.  One  could
interpret  these  findings  as  evidence  that  the  Texas  education  market  is  so
heavily  regulated  that  publlc  school  districts  are  not  able  to  respond  to
Darket  incentives.  Alternatiwely  one  could  conclude  that  the  Texas  education
market  is  contestable.  In  either  case,  our  analysis  suggests  that  reforms
aimed  solely  at  increasing  competition  auong  schools  could  be  ineffectual.20
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Table  7
Analysis  of  Variance
Inefficiency  Measures
Technical  Allocative  Scale
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